Here is an incomplete list of things I’m working on at present. It misses off things that are barely sketched, things that are out for review, and things that are very close to publication. If you’d like to read a draft, get in touch and find out whether one exists. I’m also very happy to give talks on any of these topics, and more besides.

book in progress

If I tell enough people that I’m writing a book on imagination, I’ll end up being shamed into actually doing it. The book will explicate a view of imagination on which imagining is a matter of lens-like processing of mental states. Along the way, there will be a survey of the history of imagination, a novel theory of psychological kinds, some thoughts about embodiment, a reconsideration of what on Earth imagination has to do with fiction, some material on empathy that reconceptualises what we’re trying to explain when we address that topic, and perhaps even a couple of decent jokes.  

Papers in progress: Aesthetics

watching a film is a perceptual experience

Some people say that watching a film requires a special sort of seeing, namely imaginative seeing. I say that it doesn’t; you literally see what the film presents.

the central normative notions of aesthetics

What is the point of engaging in aesthetic reasoning? To get things right, is what I argue—not just to engage in the reasoning.

aesthetic autonomy and aesthetic community

How can we reconcile the universalising demands of aesthetic community with the imperative of individual aesthetic autonomy? We can’t, so one has to go. I argue that it ought to be the second.

papers in progress: mind-ish

what are psychological kinds?

A funky sort of social kind, I think. Psychological kinds don’t have essential natural identities, but rather mutable characters grounded in the specific social practices in which they are imbricated. All of which sounds rather worryingly like Wittgenstein. (this idea will underpin some of the thinking in the book, but might exceed its boundaries)

empathy and imagination

Using one poorly defined concept to explain another is not often a programme for success, and so things stand with empathy and imagination. I argue that our thoughts about empathy have been distorted and vitiated by application of a bad theory of imagination, and that applying a better theory results in a clearer, richer understanding of what empathy is. (this will probably end up being part of the book)