Papers in progress
If you don't see a link to something you'd like to read, get in touch.
An argument that we should think of imagination quite generally as a set of lenses to to be trained on other experiences, rather than a matter of imitating counterpart experiences.
Sensory imagination: more than mere images
Some people think that any mental state involving a mental image counts as an instance of sensory imagination. I think that's wrong.
three constraints on accounts of sensory imagination's attitude
What should an account of the attitude associated with sensory imagining look like? Here are three constraints on an adequate account, derived from the failings of extant accounts. As a bonus, a sketch of a better account is developed.
A pragmatic argument for replacing the notion of sexual consent, owing to the concept's inherent ambiguities.
the cinematic image
Commissioned book chapter surveying recent work on the topic, co-written with Aaron Meskin.
outlines and talks
Bridging the gap: imagining across the lines
It's sometimes supposed that it's impossible for people of privilege to understand the experiences of those less privileged. One reason for this supposition is the thought that it's impossible to imagine the relevant experiences. Is this right? Why might we think it is? How does our implicit theory of imagination affect the answers?
just my imagination running away with me?
There's a confusing set of thoughts and intuitions in the imagination literature concerning exactly how much control we have over what we imagine, and what we should say about cases where we fail to control it. This paper attempts to make sense of that confusion.
Trying to get to grips with the relation between imaginings (i-beliefs and the like) and imagination more widely considered.
natural beauty and human beauty
Philosophers of natural beauty have surprisingly little to say about human beauty, given that humans are natural beings. What should they say? What does the answer to that question tell us about views of natural beauty?
An attempt to reconcile the general intuition that imagination has something to do with literature with the fairly convincing recent arguments that the Waltonian approach to explaining that something doesn't work.